Dear Readers,
Recently I was researching for a script for an audio program which podcasts the battles of 1971 Indo- Pakistan War. I was researching for the Battle of Poongli bridge and the airdrop at Tangail. I thought it was worth sharing. Hope you enjoy reading it.
AIRBORNE OPERATIONS OF 1971 WAR: EAST PAKISTAN:
BATTLE OF POONGLI BRIDGE
In ‘The Longest day’ and ‘The Bridge Too far’, two of the most iconic world war II movies, Hollywood went into great efforts to depict on screen two of the greatest allied forces airdrops into France and Holland respectively in the closing stages of WW II, what was called the Allied offensive to end the German occupation of Europe. In ‘A bridge too far’, Sean Connery, the iconic bond actor played the role of US 82 Airborne Division commander, units of which was were para dropped on seven different bridges to cut off the retreating German Army. If the airborne operations in East Pakistan were influenced by these two legendary world war II actions then it would great feather in the caps of India’s military planners to emulate the examples out of military history.
Airborne operations are specialised operations undertaken to achieve tactical and strategic surprise on the battlefield. The Indian Armed forces undertook four thrust lines making a multi-pronged offensive into East Pakistan to defeat the Pakistan Forces under General Niazi. Northern Thrust line was strategically placed as this thrust was aiming for the heart of East Pakistan, Dacca. This also had the shortest distance to Dacca. An ad hoc formation was spearheading the thrust line ; 101 Communication Zone, led by Major General GS Nagra. He had under command 95 Mountain Brigade with its complement of three infantry battalions and an artillery regiment, and other supporting elements. Also, there was an ad-hoc sector under Brigadier Sant Singh, Mahavir Chakra, called Foxtrot-Juliet Sector. The primary force with this sector was 6 Bihar, and a BSF Battalion (minus). However, the most crucial resource allotted for this thrust line was 50 Independent Para brigade group less a battalion. This Army Head Quarter resource was grouped for an airborne operation well in advance to cater for a contingency that should Dacca be vulnerable, the coup de grace being delivered from the air. (Dacca was never the stated objective, it was a derived one based on opportunity) Here is the story of the lone para drop operations the Indian Armed forces have undertaken, and only one after WW II.
The para drops were planned by Eastern Command Headquarters, keeping in mind the progress of operations and the strategic time frame. There was more than one contingency for the para drop. Pakistan’s 93 Infantry Brigade was holding defences in the Northern sector in the general area of Jamalpur and Mymensingh, guarding the axes of Kamalpur- Jamalpur- Tangail on the west and Haluaghat- Mymensingh- Tangail in the east part of the brigade defended sector. Both these axes converged into one, 10 km north of a town named Tangail. For troops of 93 Brigade of Pakistan, this axis was critical, to fall back to Dacca. Indian Army’s 95 Mountain Brigade, led by First Maratha (Jangi Paltan), was moving along Kamalpur-Jamalpur- Tangail axis, and 6 Bihar of the FJ Sector was moving along the Haluaghat-Mymensingh-Tangail axis. Both thrust lines encountered stiff resistance from the Pakistanis forces. An interesting incident occurred when 1st Maratha had encircled Jamalpur from the south and East; Brigadier Kler, Commander of the 95 Mountain Brigade, sent a letter to the Pakistani commander of the garrison at Jamalpur; Lieutenant Colonel Sultan Ahmed.
To The commander
Jamalpur Garrison
I am directed to inform you that your garrison has been cut off from all sides and you have no escape route available. One brigade with its full complement of artillery has already been built up and another will be arriving in the morning. In addition, you have been given the foretaste of a small element of our air force with a lot more to come.
The situation as far as you are concerned is hopeless; your higher commanders have already ditched you.
As a soldier to soldier I give you an assurance of your safety and honourable treatment when you surrender since that is the only course left to you. I am quite sure you will not be foolhardy in risking the lives of your men under your command for your personal ego… (the text has been Cut short for brevity)
The treatment I expect to be given the civil messenger shall be in according to a gentleman’s code of honour and no harm should come to him.
An immediate reply is solicited.
09 Dec 1971
Brig HS Kler
The Pakistani commander Lt Col Sultan sent the following reply. This letter has been recorded by General Jacob in his book ‘Surrender at Dacca; thus, according to it a place in the military history. The reply was sent with a bullet wrapped in it.
To Brigadier HS Kler
Dear Brigadier,
Hope this letter finds you in good spirits. Thanks for your letter.
We here in Jamalpur are waiting for the fight to commence. It has not started yet, so let’s not talk and start it.
40 sorties I may point out are inadequate. Please ask for many more.
Your remark about the messenger being given proper treatment was superfluous. Shows how you underestimate my boys. I hope he liked the tea.
Give my love to the Muktis.
Hoping to find you with a Sten in your hand next time, instead of the pen, you seem to have so much mastery over.
I am yours most sincerely
Colonel Sultan,
Commander Jamalpur forces.
This exchange of letters has become a legend of sorts. The Pakistani Garrison commander of Jamalpur, Lt Col Sultan Ahmed, was decorated with Sitara-i-Juraat, the Indian equivalent of a Vir Chakra, for his stand at Jamalpur. He survived the war, but little did he realise that within 36 hours of refusing to surrender, his brigade commander ordered him to vacate and fall back to Dacca, from the same Jamalpur garrison, which he so valiantly wanted to defend. The Pakistanis were unaware of the encirclement of Jamalpur, which Brig Kler had written in his letter. Their attempt to fall back turned into a breakout battle as the leading columns of the battalion ran into a roadblock established by 1st Marathas. The retreating battalion, 31 Baluch was decimated, as it suffered causalities, 234 killed and 34 wounded. Col Sultan Ahmed managed to escape the dragnet at Jamalpur, but he had to ultimately surrender in Dacca.
The rush of the Pakistanis Battalion out of Jamalpur resulted from an anticipated para drop by the India Army somewhere behind. The fear of being cut off led to this panic withdrawal. The para drop by 2 PARA was scheduled for the next day, i.e. 11 Dec 71.
The Para drop at Tangail was carried out by a battallion size force, which means there were elements of an infantry battalion; 2 PARA, a battery of artillery; 17 PARA Field, a company of engineers; 94 PARA Engineer company, an ADS, a surgical team and administrative elements. Such a composite force worth almost 800 men accompanied by a complement of artillery guns and towing vehicles and warlike stores like ammunition. Thus, when designed to be dropped on the ground from the air, such a composite force would require massive air effort in terms of aircraft. For Tangail, the entire party was ferried in a mixed complement of aircraft. There were the Dakotas, the Packets, Caribous and AN 12s. In terms of numbers, there were: 6 X AN 12s, 22 X C119 Packets, 22 X DC3s Dakotas and 2 X Caribous, a total of 50 aircraft, which was practically the entire fleet of the Indian Air Force at that time. The party was airlifted from two airfields in India. The personnel mounted from kalaikonda, 70 miles south of Kolkatta, and heavy stores and ammunition were mounted from Dum Dum airport in Kolkatta.
The objective of 2 PARA was to capture the Poongli bridge on the road leading to Dacca from Jamalpur and Mymensingh. It was on the Lohajang river, which is a tributary of the Brahmaputra. There were also some ferry sites East of the river which needed to be captured. The bridge was critical for a force to get to Dacca from either Jamalpur or Mymensingh, as were the ferry sites. Tangail was chosen as the Drop Zone (DZ) . Poongli bridge was to the southwest of the drop zone area. The area of Tangail was under the control of the Mukti bahini and thus was relatively safe for landing. The drop time fixed was 4.30 pm on 11 Oct 71, so that the Battalion had one hour of daylight before darkness set in.
The battalion drop at Tangail was well planned and hence hugely successful. The drop zone was secured by infiltrating an officer of the Para Brigade Signal Company, Captain Ghosh, well in advance. He had married up with the firebrand Mukti Bahini commander, Kader Siddiqui whose force controlled the countryside around Tangail. They had secured the general area of the DZ a day previous to the drop. There was complete air superiority in the area of operation thus the air defence threat was non-existence. The Pakistani forces were holding defences on a strong point concept which meant that their presence in the country sight was minimised. Yet, the drop for 2 PARA was not all smooth. The DZ was infested with ponds and slushy ground. A number of paratroopers, including the CO Lt Col Pannu, found themselves dropping into the ponds. They were rescued, and the CO went from one place to another to ensure that all that was para dropped was recovered. Two aircraft could not drop their loads on day one, and thus, they returned to drop the load the next day. These included two artillery guns, hence the first 24 hours, the battalion had to make do with only four guns.
2 PARA gathered their men and stores in good time and prepared for an assault on the bridge and the ferry sites. The intelligence given suggested the bridge and near sites were being held by a company of the Pakistani Army. Immediately after the para drop they regrouped and geared for an assault on the bridge. One company was sent to block the road coming from Jamalpur to the Poongli bridge. Two companies were earmarked to assault the bridge and the ferry sites. The Assault was launched by the battalion around 1900h (7 pm) on 11th Dec. By 2000 h the battalion had captured the bridge and the ferry sites. The swift capture of the bridge and the ferry site was attributed to the complete surprise achieved by 2 PARA against the Pakistanis. Later that night, the Pakistani launched two counter-attacks; both were beaten back with heavy casualties. Pakistanis lost almost 148 killed, ten wounded, and 29 captured. On the day of the 12th too, the Pakistanis launched two more counter-attacks, and both were repulsed with heavy casualties, about 80 killed. This action decimated the 93 Infantry brigade of Pakistan, which ceased to exist as a formation. The soldiers all ran helter-skelter, each to himself, making their escape to Dacca. Most of them were either killed or captured by the Indian armed forces and Mukti bahini. 2 PARA lost six personnel killed and 15 injured. Considering the scale of the operations, the causalities were minuscule.
After stabilising the situation at bridge, 2 PARA effected a link up with 1st Marathas (Jangi Paltan) on the evening of 12th Dec 71. The historic moment was most eagerly awaited as 2 PARA was originally 3 Marathas, and the link-up, was a historic feat for the Maratha Regiment as two of their oldest battalions were part of the history of airborne operations of independent India.
The para drop operation was one of the most successful airborne operations undertaken in the annals of military history. The operation was widely reported in the Indian and foreign press. There is an interesting anecdote which is often quoted: the BBC radio correspondent reported on the evening news on the 11th of December 1971, that the Indian army has para dropped an entire Para brigade into East Pakistan at Tangail. The Pakistanis believed it because that evening sky over Tangail was filled with parachutes. The news of an Indian brigade group sitting behind was nerve-recking for the Pakistan’s 93 brigade commander, who ordered a withdrawal from Jamalpur. It resulted in a rout, as explained earlier. It also unnerved the force commander General AAK Niazi, who was heading the Pakistan forces in Dacca. So unnerved was he that he sent an op immediate signal to Rawalpindi seeking immediate reinforcements. His signal read:
Enemy has Heli dropped approximately one brigade south of Narsinghadi and landed one para brigade in Tangail area. Request friends arrive Dacca by air first flight 12 December.
By friends, he meant the Chinese, which the Pakistanis expected would come in their support and land in East Pakistan. When the first parachutes landed, there was cheer in the Pakistani camp at Jamalpur, as they thought their friends, the Chinese have landed. Imagine their shock and fear when they realised they were Indian troops. It is widely believed that the erroneous reporting of the numbers of paratroopers dropped behind by the BBC correspondence led to the final collapse of the will of the Pakistani commanders to continue the fight in East Pakistan.
The battle of Tangail and the Para drop has gone down in golden letters in the chapters of Indian Military History. For action at Tangail 2 PARA, the commanding officer Lt Col KS Pannu was awarded the Mahavir Chakra, the second-highest award for gallantry. 2 PARA was also awarded the battle honour ‘Tangail’.
The Capture of Poongli bridge and para drop at Tangail was the Indian Army’ finest hour.
AIRBORNE OPERATIONS OF 1971 WAR: EAST PAKISTAN BATTLE OF POONGLI BRIDGE
Dear Sir, after 37 years of being a transport pilot , I can say with position of strength that you have not left any stone to reveal the historical event. With years of Supply drop and para drop experience under my belt , I am sanguine to the nuances of such an exercise . IAF is one of the few Air force , to keep the "Art Alive" and have this game changer up the sleeve. From training of younger aircrew to learn the ropes at places like Leh, Thoise, DBO, Kargil , Arunachal Pradesh ( all sectors ) is an herculean challenge.. Dove tailed with Army Para exercises and joint training needs a precise frame of mind , single aim, purpose and war fighting mindset.
Tangail drop / drop at Poongli will be taught learnt and revisited many times in future. IAF is very tech heavy now , but it is "Man behind the Machine" which will see the glorious day like Surrender At Dacca .
My kudos for very exhaustive narration. Air Commodore Parag Sharma ( Retd )